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FAIR PLAY, CONSENT AND SECURITIES
ARBITRATION: A COMMENT ON SPEIDEL"
G. Richard Shellt
INTRODUCTION
Professor Richard Speidel has given us an illuminating
survey of the situation now facing securities customers when
they have disputes with their brokers over the handling of
their accounts. As Professor Speidel sums it up, customers
have the power in theory to draft virtually any sort of arbitra-
tion clause they like and expect judicial enforcement under the
Federal Arbitration Act, provided their brokerage firm agrees
to the clause. They have wide "freedom to contract."'
As a practical matter, however, customers either do not
have or elect not to exercise their market power to shape secu-
rities industry arbitration agreements or procedures. Having
signed an arbitration clause, customers find they have no "free-
dom from contract" and must abide enforcement of the agree-
ment. As the Supreme Court so aptly put it in
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, once they
sign, customers must be "held to their bargain."3
But is securities arbitration a bargain? Despite the perva-
siveness of arbitration in the securities industry and its domi-
nance now for nearly a decade as the primary method by
which customers and brokers resolve their differences, Profes-
sor Speidel argues persuasively that securities arbitration is
not as fair as it should be.4 What, if anything, are we to do
about this? Professor Speidel has organized his essay around
0 1996 G. Richard Shell. All Rights Reserved.
t Professor of Legal Studies and Management, the Wharton School of the
University of Pennsylvania.
1 Richard E. Speidel, Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration: Whither Con-
sentg, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1335, 1337 (1996).
' 482 U.S. 220, reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987).
SId. at 233.
' Speidel, supra note 1, at 1354-56.
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the idea of "consent." But as he acknowledges in his conclu-
sion, the issue of arbitration clause enforcement in the securi-
ties industry has little to do with ordinary notions of "informed
consent, bargaining and realistic market opportunities."' At
best, securities arbitration rests on a form of tacit, implied or
what the law of contract calls "objective" consent.6 Professor
Speidel concludes, and I agree, that this weaker form of con-
sent is an inadequate foundation on which to ground the legiti-
macy of securities arbitration.
What matters is not consent but basic fairness-both pro-
cedural and substantive-of the securities arbitration system. I
am therefore sympathetic with Professor Speidel's suggestion
that a "new 'public' system" that is "cost effective, procedurally
consistent, fair and capable, as a matter of course, of producing
outcomes that are accurate and correct"7 might be in order.
I am somewhat less enthusiastic about the prospect that
this new system might require arbitrators to write full-blown
opinions and that there be judicial review on selected issues of
law.' These reforms would, I fear, eliminate the efficiencies
arbitration gains us-driving the industry back into the quag-
mire of the courts.
Overall, however, I agree with both Professor Speidel's
analysis and his conclusions. Like Professor Speidel, I believe
that the only realistic way for the securities arbitration system
to reform itself is via governmental regulatory action in cooper-
ation with self-regulatory organizations ("SROs"), such as the
New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and the National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc.
This brief Comment is organized as follows. In Part I, I
examine the issue of consent and analyze why, in most in-
stances, securities customers pay so little attention to the secu-
rities arbitration agreements they sign. This Part also looks at
modern judicial attitudes toward adhesion contracts. Next, in
Part II, I review the trends in securities arbitration reform
over the past ten years, searching for the political and organi-
zational dynamics driving and blocking reform efforts. Finally,
Speidel, supra note 1, at 1362.
6 G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV.
431, 440 (1993).
Speidel, supra note 1, at 1360.
Speidel, supra note 1, at 1362.
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I conclude with some thoughts on what might have to happen
in order to trigger the kind of reform that Professor Speidel
and I both think is necessary to make the securities arbitration
process truly fair.
I. CONSENT AND THE SECURITIES ARBITRATION CLAUSE
Wh3i is consent an issue in the discussion of securities
arbitration? The legal reason, of course, is that arbitration is
part of a contract, and the existence of a legal contract implies
some form of consent by both parties to the terms of the agree-
ment. The problem of consent in securities arbitration goes a
bit deeper than that, however. At bottom, consent addresses
itself to arbitration's credibility, i.e., its social legitimacy. The
industry wants the public and public regulators to accept arbi-
tration as a legitimate and fair substitute for court litiga-
tion-as a way to play the "game" of adjudication in this field.?
Given that we are dealing with a market mechanism and that
securities customers are relatively sophisticated adults, both
the industry and the courts can reassure themselves that sub-
stituting arbitration for regular court procedures is morally
justified if they find that the customers have somehow consent-
ed to the switch.
This a tough sale because, as Professor Speidel points out,
securities customers usually do not give explicit, informed
consent to arbitration. They just sign the form contract handed
to them by brokers without reading it. It would be relatively
easy to introduce voluntary, explicit consent into securities
arbitration. The customer-broker contract could read as fol-
lows:
The Securities and Exchange Commission has found that arbitration
is sometimes quicker, cheaper and easier to use than litigation in a
court. It is voluntary, however, and you need not agree to arbitra-
tion to open this account. You should also understand that if you do
not agree to arbitration now, you can choose arbitration later, if
and when you have a dispute related to this contract. If you wish
' See Arthur Isak Applbaum, Rules of the Game, Permissible Harms, and the
Principle of Fair Play, in WISE CHOICES: DECISIONS, GAMES, AND NEGOTIATIONS
301, 304-08 (Richard J. Zeckhauser et aL eds., 1996) (discussing how permission to
play games in which someone's rights are compromised can be morally buttressed
by obtaining consent of the participants).
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to agree to arbitration now as part of this contract, place your signa-
ture on the line following this paragraph. Otherwise, leave the line
blank.
This clause or one like it would result in fewer people
being bound to arbitration clauses when they open accounts.
Nonetheless, my guess is that a significant number of people
would end up using arbitration anyway if it gained a credible
reputation for fairness. Just the fact that the industry would
offer this clause would enhance the system's credibility. As the
reputation of the arbitration system increased, people would be
likely to turn to it with greater and greater confidence.
But this is not going to happen. The industry does not
trust the plaintiffs' bar to forego strike suits and will not place
its fate in the hands of the American jury system. The cost to
the defendant of a civil trial on a securities fraud or churning
claim against a broker, with its pre-trial discovery expenses,
tempts plaintiffs' attorneys to file claims of dubious merit in
hopes of gaining settlements based on the "nuisance value" of
litigation expenses. Meanwhile, the civil jury system subjects
securities firms to small but palpable risks that juries will
return exorbitant punitive damage awards when sympathetic
plaintiffs tell their stories of greedy brokers, bad investment
advice and lost life savings. Both of these risks are reduced in
arbitration, which limits litigation expense and eliminates the
jury.
Why don't customers object to or haggle over the arbitra-
tion clauses brokers present to them? It is not that customers
lack economic clout or the intelligence to read these clauses.
Rather, in terms of negotiation theory, customers sign arbitra-
tion clauses because firms leverage two important sources of
bargaining power: the authoritative legality of the printed
form, and what psychologists call "social proof."
How do these sources of negotiation power work? The
power of authority stems from the printed form contract and
its appearance as authoritatively "legal."' It is apparent to
HERB COHEN, You CAN NEGOTIATE ANYTHING 26-30 (Lyle Stuart, Inc. 1980)
(discussing the "power of legitimacy" as the power "derived from perceived or
imagined authority-often authority that's represented by something inanimate,
such as a sign, a form, or a printed document-normally authority that isn't ques-
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anyone looking at the printed form that someone in the legal
department has given it a lot of thought-much more thought
than any single customer wants to give it. Because customers
have many things to worry about other than the "boflerplate"
of the standard customer-broker agreement, they tend to pass
over it as they do boilerplate on everything from parking lot
receipts to computer equipment warranties.
Even if customers do read the boilerplate, they are unlike-
ly to focus on the seemingly remote contingency that they will
someday want to sue their broker. In the face of these densely
typed provisions, none of which have immediate economic
consequences to the customer on monetary issues like commis-
sion rates, customers simply "defer" to the contract's printed
authority." The securities industry stipulates arbitration as
the standard solution to the dispute resolution issue, and, in
my experience, the legal departments at member firms present
a united front in discouraging negotiation on the matter with a
customer.
I have a personal experience that illustrates the obstacles
many customers face in trying to dicker with their securities
firm over the arbitration agreement. In early 1996, I opened
several new customer accounts with the securities firm of
Smith Barney. In reviewing the customer agreements, I no-
ticed that the firm was using a choice-of-law clause that at-
tempted, very indirectly and obscurely, to eliminate the possi-
bility of punitive damages in arbitration.' I knew this be-
cause I was doing research for a law review article at the time
and knew from that research that the choice-of-law clause in
question had been ruled to be in violation of SRO rules by the
tioned").
11 ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION 218 (Wil-
liam B. Morrow & Co. 1993) (Cialdini writes that once a request is made in a
legitimately authoritative manner, people "rarely agonize... over the pros and
cons of authority's demands. In fact, our obedience frequently takes place in a
click, whirr fashion, with little or no conscious deliberation. Information from a
recognized authority can provide us a valuable shortcut for deciding how to act in
a situation.").
' The clause read as follows: 'This Agreement, all the terms herein, and its
enforcement shall be governed and construed in accordance with the laws of the
State of New York. . . regarding damages recoverable in arbitration without giv-
ing effect to principles of conflict of laws." Smith Barney Shearson Client Agree-
ment at 3, I 7 (July 1995) (on file with author).
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New York Stock Exchange. I decided not to sign the agreement
until this language was removed and began to seek a way to
negotiate this.
First, I tried to discuss the matter with Smith Barney's
legal department, but no one I could get on the phone knew
what I was talking about, and, in any event, none were willing
to discuss changing the standard language in the agreement.
Next I tried calling someone at the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"). This person understood what I was talk-
ing about but could do nothing to help me other than to sug-
gest I call the New York Stock Exchange. I called the New
York Stock Exchange's legal department and once again had
trouble locating someone who understood the significance of
choice-of-law clauses on possible punitive damage awards. It
was, after all, an obscure matter that only a law professor or a
securities firm lawyer being paid to draft the best possible
contract for the firm would be likely to know about.
After several telephone referrals within the Exchange, I
finally spoke with the New York Stock Exchange "coordinator"
for Smith Barney. This person not only knew about the puni-
tive damages controversy, but was also surprised and upset to
hear about the offending clause. When she placed a call to
Smith Barney, the response was swift and- came from the very
top-Smith Barney's General Counsel. He agreed to send me
express written confirmation that Smith Barney had waived its
choice-of-law clause for my accounts, and he subsequently did
SO.
1 3
This might sound like a success story, but it is worth re-
membering that I succeeded only in getting the firm to drop a
clause from my own personal accounts that had been banned
by the New York Stock Exchange. It is easy to imagine the
trouble an ordinary customer faces when he or she tries to
negotiate an arbitration provision that is legal under SRO
rules.
The industry also has going for it the power of "social
proof'--a phenomena that psychologist Robert Cialdini de-
13 Letter from Alan G. Brewer to Professor G. Richard Shell dated Feb. 6, 1996
(stating that "Smith Barney will not seek to interpose New York law as a defense
to a claim for punitive damages" on specified customer accounts) (on file with
author).
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scribes as our tendency to "use the actions of others to decide
on proper behavior for ourselves, especially when we view
those others as similar to ourselves." 4 To the extent custom-
ers think about the arbitration clause at all, my guess is that
they say to themselves: "There are a lot of people like me in-
vesting in the stock market and they all signed this contract,
too. Some of them must have given this some thought even if I
am too busy to do so. It must be OK."
So the best kind of consent the industry can point to as
support for the legitimacy of the system is tacit or objective
consent. Tacit consent is what we used to give when we took
an international airline flight and "consented" to the standard
$75,000 limit on claims of personal injury or wrongful death
that might arise from an airplane accident. This limitation,
formerly dictated by the Warsaw Convention as modified by
the Montreal Agreement, was incorporated into virtually every
international airline ticket until the limit was lifted by major
carriers in early 1997.' We "consented" to this limitation not
because we bargained over it, traded it off, or agreed with it.
Rather, we accepted it because we chose to fly to another coun-
try rather than take a boat, drive or stay home. The limitation
came with the airplane ride. With respect to the securities
industry, we "consent" to arbitration because we want to buy
securities rather than put our money in a bank or mutual
fund; the arbitration system comes with the privilege to buy
and sell securities whether we like it or not.
Does tacit consent take care of the legitimacy question?
There is an honored philosophical tradition that treats consent
and its relationship to the moral question of whether we
should abide by law. The philosopher John Locke used an
argument based on tacit consent to assert that everyone who
possesses or enjoys the use of land in the territory of a govern-
ment has an obligation to obey that government's laws."
" CIALDINI, supra note 11, at 142.
,' Shell, supra note 6, at 471 (discussing the $75,000 liability limitation and
the Supreme Court's approach to it); U.S. Carriers to Lift Limit on Liability on
Overseas Flights, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1997 (announcing that twelve mqjor U.S.
carriers have agreed to lift the $75,000 liability limit).
16 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT (1690), Second Treatise, § 119
(Peter Laslett ed., 1963).
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Locke was careful to limit the scope of the obligation he
found to the special possession or use being made of the land
in question. He required the much more rigorous concept of
"explicit consent" to create a permanent and general obligation
to a government.17 H.L.A. Hart and John Rawls went further
to establish a general obligation to obey the law based on our
obligation to do our "fair share" in schemes of social coopera-
tion from which we willingly benefit-even if we do not explic-
itly consent.18 Extending these philosophical arguments, per-
haps it is sufficient to say that the "use" and "benefit" of the
securities markets enjoyed by customers is sufficient justifica-
tion for an obligation by customers to obey industry rules relat-
ed to securities arbitration.
The problem with this argument is that it concedes too
much autonomy to private ordering by the securities industry
without public, governmental oversight. Would we view as
legitimate comprehensive systems of dispute resolution estab-
lished by parking garages, ski slope operators and airlines on
the basis of the receipts and tickets these entities issue? Who
would guarantee the fairness of these systems? Locke, Hart
and Rawls are talking about an obligation to obey the
government's law, not some rule of a private association, indus-
try group or gated residential community enforced by an equal-
ly private system of adjudication.
There was a time when the courts in general, and the
Supreme Court in particular, served an oversight role regard-
ing contracts that were based, at best, on tacit consent. As I
have explored in detail elsewhere, however, those days are
gone.19 The modern Supreme Court approves strict and literal
enforcement of adhesion contracts in virtually every case in
which the issue arises.2 °
My favorite Supreme Court adhesion contract case is Car-
nival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute.2 1 Shute involved a Washing-
ton state couple on a seven-day Carnival cruise off the coast of
California and Mexico. They received their tickets a few days
before leaving. The tickets contained several fine print terms
17 Id.
16 Applbaum, supra note 9, at 303.
" Shell, supra note 6, at 487-95.
20 Shell, supra note 6, at 487-95
21 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
[Vol. 62: 1365
1996] FAIR PLAY, CONSENT AND SECURITIES ARBITRATION
on the back, including a stipulation that all litigation must
take place before a court located in Florida, and a provision
stating that "[t]he Carrier shall not be liable to make any re-
fund to passengers in respect of... tickets wholly or partly not
used by a passenger."' In essence, these two clauses meant
that the Shutes either accepted the forum limitation clause or
forfeited their fares.
Mrs. Shute was injured on the ship, and when the couple
returned home, they sued Carnival for negligence in federal
district court in their home state of Washington. The appeals
court ruled for the Shutes on the grounds that consumer con-
tracts such as this were not enforceable because they were so
manifestly unfair. The Supreme Court reversed.'
In Shute, there was no evidence of consent to or even no-
tice of the forum stipulation. The Court attempted to finesse
the notice issue by claiming it had been conceded by the plain-
tiffs. The best the Court could muster as evidence of this con-
cession, however, was to say that the plaintiffs "essentially...
conceded that they had notice" of the provision, citing to a
portion of the plaintiffs' brief in which their lawyer stated that
the clause was communicated "as much as three pages of fine
print can be communicated."24
The Court therefore supported its decision to enforce the
clause entirely with arguments related to its own assumptions
regarding economic efficiency. The Court first noted that all
cruise lines would save money in the future by being able to
consolidate potential suits by far-flung passengers in one juris-
diction.' Next, the Court observed that both passengers and
cruise lines would save money by avoiding pretrial litigation on
the issue of lawsuit location." Finally, and most revealingly,
the Court said that enforcement of the forum selection clause
was especially good for passengers because "it stands to reason
that passengers who purchase tickets containing a forum
clause like that at issue in this case benefit in the form of
reduced fares reflecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys
"Id. at 597 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
23Id.
24 Id. at 590.
2Id. at 593.
26 499 U.S. at 594.
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by limiting the fora in which it may be sued."27 Of course,
without information on the competitiveness of the market in
question, this assertion only "stands to reason" if you want it
to.
Because the judicial branch-at least at the Supreme
Court level-has abandoned any role in policing contracts for
fair play, pressure has built for regulatory reform of various
contract terms within the legislative and executive branches.
For example, the U.S. government recently entered into a new
agreement through the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion that permits U.S. Airlines to waive the $75,000 liability
limitation for international air flights.28 In the case of securi-
ties arbitration, the spotlight turned toward the SEC and
SROs in the wake of the Supreme Court's 1987 decision in
Shearson /American Express, Inc. v. McMahon.9 It is thus to
the post-McMahon reform efforts that I turn next.
II. MCMAHON AND ITS AFTERMATH: WHITHER REFORM?
It is striking to me that we are discussing issues of securi-
ties arbitration reform in 1996. It is nearly ten years since the
Supreme Court decided in McMahon that claims by securities
customers alleging that their brokers had violated Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and related provi-
sions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act ("RICO") were subject to final resolution by securities in-
dustry arbitrators rather than federal courts. The decision was
a great victory for the securities industry, and one might have
expected the industry to have stabilized its dispute resolution
system by now. After all, the industry argued at the time that
arbitration would save money for everyone by creating a trust-
worthy, reliable and efficient alternative to the court sys-
tem. °
27 Id.
28 Lee S. Kreindler, The End of Airline Liability Limits, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 30,
1996, at 3 (reporting that U.S. is set to approve a new International Air Trans-
port Association agreement to eliminate the $75,000 liability limit on international
air carriers); see supra note 11.
29 482 U.S. 220, reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987).
" William Glaberson, When the Investor Has a Gripe, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,
1987, § 3, at 1 (summarizing industry arguments for arbitration prior to Supreme
[Vol. 62: 13651374
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With a decade's worth of perspective, I am still confused
about the industry's motives over the last ten years. The cynic
in me says that McMahon and its progeny were really nothing
more than a program by securities industry lawyers to protect
their clients from damage claims for broker misconduct, not an
attempt to create an efficient system of "alternative justice."
How else to explain why securities firms have gone to such
devious lengths to bar punitive damages under the guise of
obscure choice-of-law provisions or to litigate so aggressively to
restrict customer access to the American Arbitration Associa-
tion ("AA")"
On the other hand, I have come to know some of the good
people who manage the securities arbitration systems of the
various SROs, and they are genuinely trying to make the sys-
tem work for everyone. My sense is that the SROs, with occa-
sional help from regulatory agencies, have fought a decade-
long, low-intensity campaign against the brokerage firm legal
departments over securities arbitration issues and that the
SROs have lost more battles than they have won.
In preparation for this conference, and as a way of mea-
suring just how far we have come, I pulled out a faded copy of
the Wall Street Journal from March 3, 1987, the day the Court
heard arguments in McMahon. On that day, I published an op-
ed article in the Journal pointing out the importance of the
case and arguing that, if handled correctly, arbitration of feder-
al statutory claims would be good for both customers and bro-
kers.32 I went on to express my hope, however, that McMahon
would "spark Congress and the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission to reexamine and reform the rules governing securities
Court decision in McMahon).
3 Litigation by industry defendants to prevent customers from choosing the
AAA under the so-called "AMEX Window" rule has been typical of this anti-AAA
sentiment. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Commentary, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 376, 385
(1996); Perry Wallace, Securities Arbitration After McMahon, Rodriguez and the
New Rules: Can Investors Really Be Protected?, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1235
(1990).
"G. Richard Shell, Keep Broker-Client Disputes Out of Court, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 3, 1987, at A22.
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arbitration"3 because it seemed to me then, as now, that the
system was tilted toward the industry in ways that undercut
its credibility.
I called for five reforms, all of which were part of the aca-
demic and professional dialogue of the day. First, recognizing
that McMahon was limited to the 1934 Securities and Exchange
Act and RICO, I thought Congress should clear the statutory
underbrush from this whole field and declare that all statu-
tory claims arising from customer-broker disputes should be
subject to "voluntary, contractual arbitration."' I thought
that this might save everyone a lot of trouble because I felt
sure that this would be the ultimate result. Congress did not
act, and it took several additional rounds of Supreme Court
litigation to wrap up the "statutory claims" question-a story
well-summarized by Professor Speidel.35
Second and most radically, I called for the SEC to adopt
regulations guaranteeing "free choice" to customers who might
not want to sign a take-it-or-leave-it arbitration clause. " I
referenced Commodity Futures Trading Commission regula-
tions that prohibit a commodities professional from requiring a
customer to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of
utilizing the services offered by the professional. This provision
requires the standard brokerage agreement to state that 'You
need not sign this [arbitration] agreement to open an account
with [name of broker]. " I felt then that an "informed" or "ex-
plicit" consent standard would greatly improve the credibility
of securities arbitration with customers. As I mentioned earli-
er, the industry is unlikely to take this suggestion for fear of
plaintiffs' lawyers and the American jury.
Third, I argued that customers should be given a greater
role in selecting their arbitrators than was the case in 1987.38
I contended that securities industry arbitration should adopt
the "list method" of arbitrator selection used by the AAA. The
Ruder Commission, on which Professor Speidel served, recom-
s Shell, supra note 32.
3' Shell, supra note 32.
3' Speidel, supra note 1, at 1340-44.
5' Shell, supra note 32, at A22.
31 17 C.F.R. 180.3(b)(1) (1990).
31 Shell, supra note 32, at A22.
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mended exactly this reform in its 1996 report.' Time will tell if
the industry moves toward the AAA model in response to this
latest recommendation.
Fourth, I urged that the definition of a "public arbitrator"
be tightened to reduce the perception that such arbitrators
might be biased toward the industry."' This issue is also still
troubling securities arbitration. The Ruder Commission noted
that a retired lawyer who, three years before, concluded an
entire career of representing industry defendants is considered
a "public arbitrator."4 Based on its hope that the industry
will adopt the AAA "list system" to select arbitrators, the Com-
mission saw the "public arbitrator" problem fading away be-
cause customers would be playing a bigger role in constructing
the panel.42
Finally, I argued that arbitrators should be required to
certify in writing that they considered and decided each of the
federal statutory claims put to them by the parties.' As I un-
derstand the practice in most SRO arbitration forums, this is
now done. Professor Speidel wonders whether this requirement
should be expanded to include a full-blown opinion followed by
judicial review of questions of law." As I explained earlier, I
object to this suggestion on the grounds of efficiency. These
requirements would eliminate any incentive the industry
might have to prefer arbitration over court proceedings, thus
thrusting everyone into a situation in which only lawyers
would win.
The major issue missing from my 1987 list was the matter
of whether arbitrators may award punitive damages against
brokers." This issue perhaps more than any other has re-
vealed the fault lines between industry SROs and their own
member firms regarding arbitration. Some member firms have
fought what amounts to a guerilla war against punitive dam-
"NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, SECURITIES ARBITRATION
REFORM: REPORT OF THE ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE 94-96 (1996) thereinaf-
ter RUDER REPORT].
40 Shell, supra note 32, at A22.
', RUDER REPORT, supra note 39, at 96-97.
42 RUDER REPORT, supra note 39, at 96-97.
" Shell, supra note 32, at A22.
Speidel, supra note 1, at 1362.
" Speidel, supra note 1, at 1358.
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ages, using arcane, ambiguous choice-of-law clauses
piggybacking on tacit consent arguments to rid themselves of
this liability risk. The Supreme Court has rejected their inter-
pretations of these clauses,46 however, and the SROs have
written rules prohibiting contractual provisions that limit the
"ability of arbitrators to make any award."47 Finally, a Com-
mission appointed by the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc. ("NASD") recently proposed, and the NASD ac-
cepted, a reform under which punitive damages will be allowed
in arbitration but capped at three times compensatory damag-
es or $750,000, whichever is less. It remains to be seen wheth-
er the SEC will approve this new rule.4"
Punitive damages notwithstanding, many of the controver-
sies that were clearly visible on the horizon in 1987 are still
with us. We have thus spent a decade litigating, studying,
recommending and arguing as arbitration proceedings have
gotten longer, awards higher, and the grounds for appeal based
on such things as choice-of-law clauses more technical. Over
the years, industry dissatisfaction has grown to levels that al-
most (but not quite) equal the dissatisfaction that customers
felt right from the start. In short, securities arbitration has not
turned out to be the simple alternative to the courts that ev-
eryone hoped it would be, and the industry has brought itself
some bad publicity as well as legal complexity by fighting re-
form at virtually every opportunity.
CONCLUSION
Where do we go from here? As Professor Speidel points
out, the Ruder Commission Report is the current focal point for
securities arbitration reform. It contains many helpful recom-
mendations, but it advocates expressly permitting (and cap-
4 Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
'" See NYSE Information Memorandum No. 95-16 (Apr. 17, 1995) (on file with
author); NASD, Notice to Members No. 95-16, 1995 NASD LEXIS 28 (Mar. 1995).
" RUDER REPORT, supra note 39; Leslie Eaton, Arbitration Rules Would Give
Some, Take Some, N.Y. TMIES, Nov. 17, 1996, § 3, at 3 (noting that the NASD
had approved the Ruder Commission proposal regarding punitive damages and
stating that the SEC "must still approve the changes").
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ping) punitive damage awards-a bitter pill for the industry to
swallow that will not necessarily cure the system's credibility
problem.
And if the industry does not have sufficient incentives to
engage in the major reforms that are needed to create the
perception of a fair, credible arbitration system, what other
groups or institutions might? Securities arbitration reform has
waned as an issue in Congress with republican majorities in
both the House and Senate. Even with a democratic Congress,
arbitration issues never got past the hearings stage. And the
SEC has many important issues now facing it, in addition to
arbitration, including the implementation of the Private Secu-
rities Litigation Reform Act of 1995."
It is instructive to note that, according to one commenta-
tor, the airlines pushed for eliminating the $75,000 liability
limit for international flights only after the limitation became
"politically untenable" and threatened to "severely affect" com-
ponent and aircraft manufacturers by making these manufac-
turers alternative targets for "adequate damages.' Using
this as a test case for the political economy of adhesion con-
tract reform, it might be helpful for securities customers to
target accounting firms, law firms or the securities exchanges
in their litigation. This is fanciful, however. There are no legal
grounds I know of for such suits against third parties that
would add to the pressure for securities arbitration reform.
Another catalyst for change might be a second major stock
market crash along the lines of the October 1987 drop. This is
a fate I do not wish on any of us, but a crash would send a
new generation of individual investors into the arbitration
system in a big, unhappy group. Regulators and legislators
might then be forced to respond to cries that the system still
looks unfair to the average person.
In summary, we are left with commentators arguing that
reform is the "right thing to do" on the grounds of justice, fair-
ness and the industry's own enlightened self-interest. The
49 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.CA. §§
77a to 78u-s (1996)).
" Kreindler, supra note 28, at 3.
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brokerage industry, meanwhile, continues to rely on the theory
of tacit consent to win enforcement in the courts of any clause
they can get past their SROs.
Occupying the ground between customers and brokers are
the real guardians of arbitration-the SROs themselves. The
SROs struggle yearly to make as much progress toward reform
as the general counsels of their member firms will permit. It is
a tough job, and the SROs deserve all the support we can give
them until some major political or economic event gives them
the political leverage they need to create the alternative sys-
tem of justice Professor Speidel advocates and securities cus-
tomers deserve.
